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The ability to remember events in vivid, multisensory detail is a significant part 
of human experience, allowing us to relive previous encounters and providing 
us with the store of memories that shape our identity.  Recent research has 
sought to understand the subjective experience of remembering: what it feels 
like to have a memory.  Such remembering involves reactivating sensory-
perceptual features of an event, and the thoughts and feelings we had when 
the event occurred, integrating them into a conscious first-person 
experience.  It allows us to reflect on the content of our memories, and to 
understand and make judgments about them, such as distinguishing events 
that actually occurred from those we might have imagined or been told 
about.  In this review, we consider recent evidence from functional 
neuroimaging in healthy participants and studies of neurological and 














In search of the subjective experience of remembering 
Humans have a remarkable ability to transcend the present moment. With the 
most minimal of cues, an individual can cast backwards or forwards in time, 
reliving past events or constructing immersive representations of future ones. 
These jaunts along a personal timeline can be voluntary or involuntary, 
intentional or otherwise, and appear to lie within the reach of all human 
beings, with the possible exception of infants and those who have suffered 
certain kinds of neurological damage. Projecting itself through time is one of 
the most remarkable tricks the human mind can pull off. 
 Scientific accounts of memory often focus on its instrumental value as 
a storage device. Researchers consider what memory offers the organism 
functionally, in terms of manipulating cognitive representations over short- and 
long-term timescales; how it provides a database of experiences from which 
to plan strategies for the future; and how it might have evolved under various 
selective pressures. Memory is certainly at its most tractable as a 
phenomenon when thought of as a mechanism for information storage, whose 
inputs, outputs and errors can be carefully quantified. Much of what we know 
about how humans remember has stemmed from this approach, with its 
concomitant focus on memory’s objective, measurable parameters.  
 But remembering – perhaps foremost among mental processes – also 
has a phenomenology. In philosophical parlance, there is ‘something that it is 
like’ to be a remembering being: to be reminded of the past, to be in thrall to it, 
and to be able to reinhabit it, sometimes in as much vivid detail as the present 
moment. Memories have qualities that are known to the experiencer. These 
subjective dimensions also mean that memories are capable of being 
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represented and shared in a variety of ways: in constructions and artefacts 
that include the artistic and the literary, but also in the personal narratives that 
we tell ourselves and communicate to those around us. Memory’s precious 
constructions stay with us as vivid, multidimensional experiences – and 
sometimes, in the case of intense emotion and trauma, linger for longer than 
we would like.  
 Science needs to concern itself with these subjective aspects too. They 
afford us, as human beings, the selective advantage of being able to reflect 
on the content of our memories, and to make judgments about them as 
conscious representations, such as in distinguishing events that actually 
occurred from those we might have imagined or been told about. This 
reflective ability enables us to place greater weight on real as opposed to 
imagined experiences, when adapting our behavior or predicting future 
outcomes in light of what we have learned. Memory founds an individual’s 
sense of identity, and distortions to its narratives can lead to distress and 
mental ill-health. Investigating the subjective qualities of autobiographical 
memories, such as the ‘feeling of remembering’ (Conway 2009), presents 
opportunities for understanding how memories differ from other related mental 
states such as future-oriented cognitions, hallucinations and acts of 
imagination. There are also likely important individual differences in the extent 
to which humans can re-experience moments from their pasts, and in the 
vividness, emotionality, multimodality and temporal sequencing of those 
representations, including their relationship to the self. The ability to engage in 
‘mental time-travel’ (Tulving 1983) is significant for comparative psychology 
and neuroscience, with important work ongoing on the extent to which non-
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human animals have the ability to relive events from their own pasts – 
research which in turn provides crucial insights into human brain mechanisms.  
 Our focus in this review is on the subjective experience of 
autobiographical memory, defined as that category of episodic memory that 
relates to the events of our own lives. Previously limited by concerns about 
self-report and introspection, the cognitive neuroscience of the subjective 
experience of remembering has made substantial progress in recent years, 
partly due to the emergence of new methodologies for understanding both 
subjective experience and brain mechanisms. We have recently argued that 
such an endeavor will likely benefit from analyses that cut across levels of 
explanation and incorporate insights from the arts and humanities as well as 
the neurosciences (Simons et al. 2020). We have described seven levels of 
analysis at which memory can be understood, and across which it can be 
useful to draw interdisciplinary connections: the molecular, cellular, neural, 
cognitive, personal, social and cultural. Although our focus in the present 
article is on neural mechanisms underlying the subjective (personal) 
experience of remembering, we would emphasize that any such endeavor will 
only be as successful as the efforts to describe the experience that the 
neuroscience is purported to explain. Where such examples illuminate the 
issues in question, we will adopt them from literature, the arts and other areas 
of intellectual activity.  
 
Towards a science of the subjective experience of remembering  
There is a long history to human beings’ fascination with their ability to inhabit 
their own pasts. In the fourth century BCE, Aristotle analyzed recollection as a 
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process of re-experiencing an original perception ‘conditioned by lapse of 
time’. Memory was a topic of profound interest to thinkers in the Middle Ages, 
with the emergence of sophisticated theories that in some ways predate the 
thought currents of contemporary cognitive neuroscience (Dudai & Carruthers 
2005). Central to such thinking was the conception of memory as a faculty 
whose purpose was to generate alternative representations of reality, a view 
that is congruent with contemporary theoretical models of the relations 
between past- and future-related cognitions (Fernyhough, 2012; Addis et al. 
2007).  
 The emergence of scientific psychology in the second half of the 
nineteenth century gave researchers powerful new methods for investigating 
the phenomenological features of memories. Scientific efforts were broadly 
divided between the rigorously quantitative approach of scientists like 
Ebbinghaus, with their focus on the reproduction of lists of learned syllables, 
and the more subjective inquiries of Galton and others, who used diaries to 
record the first-person features of their own memories (Draaisma 2004).  
 In more recent times, several contemporary scholars have contributed 
particularly to scientific progress in understanding the subjective experience of 
remembering. Endel Tulving’s (1983) development of the idea of mental time-
travel has focused researchers’ attention on the cognitive and biological 
processes that enable an organism to roam across past, present and future. 
Marcia Johnson’s (1993) source monitoring framework understands 
judgements about what constitutes an act of remembering (as distinct from an 
imagining or hallucination) as involving the sifting of multiple different sources 
of information, including the vividness, richness and emotionality of the 
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representation. Daniel Schacter’s work (e.g., Schacter 1996; Schacter et al. 
1998) has understood memories as mental constructions that can have vivid 
subjectivity but that are prone to a variety of reconstructive errors, each of 
which are telling about the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underpin 
them (Loftus 2017).   
 These advances at the cognitive and personal levels of analysis set out 
some of the explananda for understanding the brain mechanisms of the 
subjective experience of remembering. Before reviewing the relevant 
neuroscience, we focus on some of the key features of episodic memory that 
must be brought into any such account.  
 
The reconstructive nature of memory 
The narrative form of acts of remembering lends them particularly to literary 
treatments. In the novels of Toni Morrison (1987) and Kazuo Ishiguro (1995), 
to take two examples, moments from the past are experienced not as fixed 
representations but as aggregations of experience that are endlessly 
recombined and negotiated to meet the exigencies of reality and the needs of 
the rememberer. Memory in such fictions is an unstable landscape in an 
unreliably narrated world, in which it can be difficult to be sure of the 
authenticity of what is being experienced as a representation of the past. This 
view of memory resonates with the formulation of Lord Byron (1821): ‘It is 
singular how soon we lose the impression of what ceases to be constantly 
before us... There is little distinct left without an effort of memory, then indeed 
the lights are rekindled for a moment – but who can be sure that imagination 
is not the torch-bearer?’  
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 Artistic and literary treatments frequently emphasize this making and 
remaking of past events in the act of recalling the past. This puts them 
somewhat at odds with a widespread popular misunderstanding of 
autobiographical memory as a literal act of reproduction, in which a 
representation of an event can be summoned back into consciousness like 
the playing of a mental DVD. The insights of writers such as Morrison and 
Ishiguro are more closely aligned with scientific models of memory as an act 
of reconstruction, in which representations of past events are assembled at 
the time of recall under the influence of varied biases and pressures, some of 
which have little to do with the remembered event. Continuing the literary 
theme, contemporary research into autobiographical memory views it as an 
act of storytelling by a brain that can integrate multiple sources of relevant 
information, but which does not store fixed representations or neural ‘files’ 
corresponding to the event in question.  
 On the reconstruction view, remembering involves reactivating sensory 
and perceptual features of an event, and the thoughts and feelings we had 
when the event occurred, integrating them into a conscious first-person 
experience. One significant problem for cognitive neuroscience is to explain 
how these processes occur across the many different neural systems involved 
in autobiographical memory. A further challenge concerns the ‘cognitive 
feelings’ (Conway 2009) which distinguish memories from representations of 
other counterfactual scenarios such as envisaged future events (Schacter et 
al. 2007) or acts of imagination (Johnson et al. 1993). Why are memory 
constructions experienced subjectively as memories, rather than as 
something else? How does our confidence in such judgments dissociate from 
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their veridicality? How do such attributions break down in neurological or 
psychiatric states, such as confabulation or delusion? Recent evidence allows 
such questions to be addressed as part of an account of the subjective 
experience of remembering. 
 
The multisensory experience of remembering 
Another conundrum for a neuroscientific account of remembering is to explain 
how memories can incorporate multiple streams of sensory information. The 
novelist Virginia Woolf’s description of her earliest memory, for example, from 
her autobiographical ‘A Sketch of the Past’ (Woolf 1985), incorporates tactile, 
auditory and visual impressions in conjunction with feelings and cognitions: 
‘hearing the waves breaking … seeing this light, and feeling … the purest 
ecstasy I can conceive’ (p. 64). This multisensory quality of the psychology of 
remembering presents a challenge to attempts to understand memory’s 
underlying neural mechanisms, given how sensory processing in the brain is 
spread among distinct (and in some cases relatively distant) anatomical 
systems. Somehow the variety of sensory information that has to be 
incorporated into a memory representation must be brought together and 
integrated across neural systems in creating the distinctive subjective 
experience of remembering.  
 
Memory and the self 
Autobiographical memories do not only give us a rich multimedia experience; 
they also come with a distinct sense that they are relevant to our own self, 
rather than to anyone else. As William James (1890) wrote: ‘Memory requires 
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more than mere dating of a fact in the past. It must be dated in my past.’ This 
feature of memory has inspired important theoretical work in psychology on 
the relation between autobiographical memory and the autobiographical self 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce 2000). The processes by which memories are 
associated with the self are strongly modulated by social processes, such as 
in conflicts among adult siblings around memories of a shared childhood, 
which can lead to one sibling claiming a memory that actually ‘belongs’ to the 
other (Sheen et al. 2001). More serious distortions to the associations 
between memory and the self have been linked to severe mental disorders 
such as psychosis and schizophrenia (Frith & Done 1989), and with 
hallucinatory states in which crucial self-related contextual information is 
sheared off from the memory construction, leaving the ‘free-floating’ 
mnemonic representations that are distinctive of trauma (Hardy et al. 2005).  
 
First-person perspective 
Memory tells its stories from different points of view. Most commonly we re-
experience the past from the perspective we adopted when living through the 
original events: that is, from our perspectives as first-person observers. In The 
Prelude, for example, William Wordsworth (1850) observed: ‘Oh! many a time 
have I, a five years’ Child, / … / Made one long bathing of a summer’s day, / 
Bask’d in the sun, and plunged, and bask’d again.’ Not all memories are 
experienced from the point of view of the original experiencer, however. 
Another form of autobiographical memory includes a third-person perspective 
on the self as a participant in events, a finding that interested Sigmund Freud 
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in his discussion of the reconstructed nature of what he called ‘screen 
memories’ (Freud 1975).  
 Building on these early insights, a significant contribution to the 
psychological study of the subjective experience of remembering came with 
empirical findings of a distinction between field (first-person) and observer 
(third-person) memories (Nigro & Neisser 1983). First-person 
autobiographical memories tend to be rated higher on subjective vividness, 
sensory detail, and emotional intensity, whereas remembering the objective 
circumstances of an event leads to relatively more third-person memories. 
Any account of the brain mechanisms of remembering faces a challenge to 
explain how memories can be experienced from these two primary 
perspectives, along with findings that such perspectival features are 
modulated by emotion (Robinson & Swanson 1993).  
 
Social and cultural influences on memory 
One area of burgeoning research interest has concerned how episodic 
memories are constructed under the influence of various social and cultural 
forces. In the example already discussed, social processes around sibling 
memory disputes have been shown to shape individual memory accounts in 
powerful ways. Other phenomena with implications for the subjective 
experience of remembering are social contagion (Harris et al. 2017), memory 
conformity (Maswood et al. 2019) and collaborative remembering (Rajaram 
2011). Questions about the phenomenology of remembering are also relevant 
to the growth of research into collective memories (Hirst et al. 2018). When 
memories are shared across social and cultural groups, questions arise about 
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the extent to which they can be described in terms of their subjective, person-
centered qualities. If they can, the processes involved in creating such 
distributed experiences need to be brought into the scientific account. 
Similarly, autobiographical memory appears highly sensitive to cultural and 
contextual differences (Wang 2016). If we are to ask the ‘What is it like?’ 
questions about the first-person experience of memory, it appears that we 
must strive towards explanations pitched at the social and cultural as well as 
the personal and cognitive levels of explanation.  
 
Methodologies for studying subjective experience 
If the phenomenology of remembering has only relatively recently become 
tractable to scientific inquiry, one reason for the delay is likely to be well-
known difficulties with the empirical study of subjective experience. As noted, 
qualitative studies of memory have traditionally relied on self-report and diary 
methods. Such prospective or retrospective reports, of the kind often 
produced in pre- or post-scan interviews (St. Jacques & De Brigard 2015), are 
themselves susceptible to reconstructive errors, as well as being subject to 
biasing expectations about ‘normative’ memory performance, along with self-
theoretical assumptions about what kind of memory the respondent has.  
 Potentially more reliable are methods for sampling experience that try 
to capture acts of remembering as they unfold. A drawback to such 
approaches is their potential to disrupt the free flow of unconstrained recall, in 
addition to the challenge of integrating sampling methods with neuroscientific 
techniques such as neuroimaging, with the risk of probe stimuli introducing 
artefacts into hemodynamic or EEG signals. Some of these pitfalls have 
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begun to be addressed in recent work with Descriptive Experience Sampling 
(DES), a method in which, through an iterative process involving repeated 
sampling of moments of experience followed by expositional interviews, 
participants gain expertise in reporting what was in their experience at the 
moment just before they heard a beeper sound. Successful integration of this 
method with fMRI has shown its potential as a method for obtaining more 
nuanced descriptions of experience than have previously been possible in 
neuroimaging studies (e.g., Fernyhough et al. 2018). Another promising 
methodological avenue involves free recall of narrative videos, in which 
participants watch a movie and then verbally describe the events that took 
place in the movie while being scanned with fMRI (e.g., Chen et al. 2017; 
Baldassano et al. 2017). Challenges remain, however, including the caveat 
that even the most careful experience-sampling or recall method involves a 
necessary time lag between experience and report, and thus a residual risk of 
reconstructive errors.  
 These endeavors have come at a time of renewed interest in the more 
general problem of integrating subjective and neural data on human 
experience. To date, there has been little work specifically harnessing these 
new integrated methods to the study of autobiographical memory, but they 
offer promise for new multilevel understandings of the processes of 
remembering (Simons et al. 2020). They may also be particularly relevant for 
challenging assumptions about the unitary, serial nature of experience. Again, 
literary and artistic models are helpful here. One of the greatest insights of 
Marcel Proust’s masterpiece, À la Recherche du Temps Perdu (In Search of 
Lost Time) is that memory always operates with a dual perspective: the point 
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of view of the rememberer held in relation to that of the original experiencer 
(Shattuck 1983). One profound implication for research in this area is that, if 
the subjective experience of remembering can be described with sufficient 
detail and precision, it may reveal itself to operate at multiple simultaneous 
temporal scales. Understanding these complexities of the subjective 
experience of remembering, and integrating them across levels of analysis, 
will require continued methodological progress.  
 
Understanding the brain mechanisms of remembering 
A common approach in cognitive neuroscience research is to ascribe 
distinct cognitive processes to individual brain regions. Such a region-focused 
approach originates from neuropsychological studies of patients with focal 
brain damage, where specific profiles of cognitive dysfunction have been 
attributed to damage in a particular brain area. With neuroimaging have come 
new opportunities to study regional specialization across the entire brain, 
allowing researchers greater flexibility in comparing and contrasting the 
cognitive functions of different brain regions. In addition, findings from 
neuroimaging have cast light on brain regions not previously considered to be 
important for memory, such as the lateral parietal cortex. In line with a region-
focused approach to episodic memory, recent studies have revealed 
interesting dissociations in how distinct brain regions contribute to the 
processes of recollection. For instance, in one study, brain activity was 
recorded while participants reconstructed the visual details of composite 
scenes linking an object to a particular scene location, color, and orientation. 
The results revealed a dissociation between hippocampal and lateral parietal 
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contributions to recollection: whereas hippocampal activity was associated 
with their general success in retrieving event features, left lateral parietal 
cortex activity tracked the specificity with which individual features were 
reconstructed (Richter et al. 2016; see also, Cooper et al. 2017). Other 
studies have linked hippocampal activity to the overall vividness of episodic 
simulation and lateral parietal activity to the total number of event details 
generated (Thakral et al. 2017a, 2020), again suggesting a distinction 
between the construction of an event and rendering its specific details. We 
review other such dissociations as we consider below the roles of three brain 
regions whose contribution to the subjective experience of remembering has 
only recently become apparent: the hippocampus, lateral parietal cortex, and 
anterior prefrontal cortex.  
In recent years, there has also been growing interest in understanding 
the roles of brain networks in remembering (Ranganath & Ritchey 2012; 
Simons & Spiers 2003). This is not a new idea: it has been long hypothesized 
that intact memory function depends on communication among brain systems 
(Luria 1965; Warrington & Weiskrantz 1982). Neuroimaging has since 
revealed that episodic memory is associated with activity in a diverse set of 
brain regions including the hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, 
retrosplenial cortex, left lateral parietal cortex, posterior cingulate, precuneus, 
and medial prefrontal cortex. As part of the default network, this posterior 
medial system has been described as a core network for episodic 
construction (Addis et al. 2007), recollection (Rugg & Vilberg 2013), and 
contextual processing (Ranganath & Ritchey 2012). In the context of memory, 
the posterior medial system is thought to support key aspects of the 
16 
 
subjective experience of remembering — namely, reconstructing multimodal 
event features into a vivid, cohesive recollective experience (Addis et al. 
2007; Ritchey & Cooper 2020; Rugg & Vilberg 2013). The functions of these 
regions appear to be interdependent: they are consistently co-activated with 
one another and functionally connected during episodic tasks (Cooper & 
Ritchey 2019; Geib et al. 2017; King et al. 2015; Schedlbauer et al. 2014). 
They also exhibit strong functional connectivity with one another during the 
resting state (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010). Moreover, functional connectivity 
of this network has been shown to correlate with retrieval of contextual source 
information (King et al. 2015; Schedlbauer et al. 2014), memory vividness 
(Geib et al. 2017), and memory precision (Cooper & Ritchey 2019), with the 
hippocampus acting as a hub for memory-dependent interactions (Geib et al. 
2017; Schedlbauer et al. 2014).   
 Recently, there have been calls to integrate region- and network-based 
approaches to understanding the neural bases of episodic memory (Cabeza 
et al. 2018; Cowell et al. 2019; Ritchey & Cooper 2020). For instance, 
although the overarching process of recollection appears to be most strongly 
associated with an integrated network of regions, the unique contributions of 
individual regions might be understood by mapping out the component 
operations and representations of recollection (Cowell et al. 2019). Distinct 
brain regions affiliate with one another during particular cognitive tasks, 
forming process-specific alliances (Cabeza et al. 2018), with some alliances 
appearing to be relatively stable across tasks whereas others may be more 
task-dependent. Due to the flexibility of network interactions, it may be that 
searching for one-to-one mappings would be insufficient to explain the 
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relationships between cognitive functions and brain regions: an individual 
brain region might make distinct contributions to cognition depending on its 
neural context (McIntosh 2000), with different connections mediating different 
functions (Davis et al. 2017), and some cognitive functions may be best 
understood as emerging from inter-regional and inter-network interactions 
(Fernyhough 2010; Luria 1965). Here, we take a hybrid approach, considering 
the unique contributions of individual brain regions to recollection, while also 
considering their relationships across the dynamic process of remembering. 
Although the hippocampus, lateral parietal cortex, and anterior prefrontal 
cortex appear to support partially distinct components of recollection, it is 
through their flexible interaction that these components give rise to a full-
fledged recollective experience.  
 
Hippocampus 
The hippocampus has long been understood to be crucial for normal 
memory functioning. Bilateral damage to the hippocampus and its surrounding 
medial temporal cortex results in severe memory deficits (Scoville & Milner 
1957), marked by impairments in forming new memories and in retrieving the 
specific details of past events. Since the first discovery of the close 
connection between the hippocampus and memory processes, we have 
learned a great deal about its contributions to episodic memory and, 
specifically, the experience of recollection (Eichenbaum et al. 2007; Montaldi 
& Mayes 2010). Here, we review evidence indicating that the hippocampus 
acts to bind together the features of an event, including its spatial and 
temporal context, and supports the access and reactivation of these features 
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during retrieval. In doing so, the hippocampus provides the informational 
foundation for the subjective experience of remembering.  
 
Binding of contextual details 
The hippocampus supports the formation of flexible associations 
between different things that co-occur in space and time (Cohen & 
Eichenbaum 1993) — for instance, remembering who was at a party, where it 
was, what kind of music was playing, and so on. Patients with hippocampal 
damage are impaired at remembering the contextual associations of an event 
(Spiers et al. 2001; Yonelinas 2002) and other forms of relational processing 
(Konkel et al. 2008), even when they are able to recognize which individual 
items they have seen before. Parallel findings from neuroimaging studies 
have linked the hippocampus specifically to associative memory processes 
(e.g., Giovanello et al. 2004). Through its associative function, the 
hippocampus indexes an integrated representation of the relationships among 
specific event features (Ekstrom & Yonelinas 2020). Central to these 
representations is the spatial and temporal context in which the event 
occurred. An event’s spatial and temporal contexts often serve as the 
scaffolding that attaches other event features (Ekstrom & Yonelinas 2020; 
Robin 2018): we remember not only that two items co-occurred, but how they 
were positioned in space or time relative to one another. Spatial codes in the 
hippocampus are allocentric, containing information about features in the 
environment relative to one another rather than to one’s own viewpoint. 
Through this allocentric coding scheme, the hippocampus has been described 
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as representing a ‘cognitive map’ of the environment (O’Keefe & Nadel 1978) 
that can be used to bind and organize the features of experience.  
Although the spatial functions of the hippocampus have long been 
appreciated, more recent work has highlighted the role of time in organizing 
episodic representations in the hippocampus (Davachi & DuBrow 2015; 
Eichenbaum 2014). In rodents, hippocampal firing patterns are modulated by 
time (Eichenbaum 2014), and in humans, patterns of hippocampal activity are 
sensitive to the temporal structure of events (Davachi & DuBrow 2015; Hsieh 
et al. 2014). This time sensitivity has functional consequences: changes in 
hippocampal activity at event transitions predict memory for the preceding 
events (Baldassano et al. 2017; Ben-Yakov & Dudai 2011) and influence 
memory for temporal information (Davachi & DuBrow 2015), suggesting a 
mechanism by which recent experiences are carved into memorable episodes 
that can be replayed during recollection. Indeed, at the time of retrieval, 
hippocampal activity patterns recapitulate the spatial and temporal similarities 
of real-world events (Nielson et al. 2015) (Figure 1A). Together, these lines of 
evidence suggest that the hippocampus binds the features of experience 
along dimensions of space and time, providing a basis for the sense of mental 
time-travel that accompanies recollection.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Accessing and reactivating event features 
 So far, we have discussed how the hippocampus represents the 
relationships between event features and the specific episodic context of 
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memories. But how is this information leveraged to support the subjective 
experience of remembering? By providing relational structure, the 
hippocampus supports the access of event representations given a partial 
cue, followed by reactivation of the other details of the event through pattern 
completion (Marr 1971; Norman & O’Reilly 2003). Consistent with this idea, 
activity in the hippocampus has been especially linked to the access of 
episodic memories — that is, the moment of ‘ecphory’ in which an existing 
memory is brought to mind — showing an increase in activity as participants 
successfully retrieve a memory in response to a cue (Addis et al. 2007; 
Daselaar et al. 2008; Vilberg & Rugg 2012) (Figure 1B). This initial phase of 
memory access (or construction, as it is sometimes called) is followed by a 
period of elaboration as memory details are maintained in memory. The 
hippocampus tends to be less involved in this latter phase, which instead 
recruits prefrontal, lateral parietal, and/or medial parietal regions (Addis et al. 
2007; Daselaar et al. 2008; Vilberg & Rugg 2012). This dissociation parallels 
other evidence linking hippocampal activity to the general success of 
associative retrieval, whereas activity in medial and lateral parietal regions 
was associated with qualitative aspects of recollection (Richter et al. 2016). 
Notably, similar temporal dissociations emerge during imagination of future 
events (Addis et al. 2007), suggesting that the hippocampus may be involved 
in accessing and integrating details that inform any episodic representation, 
not only memories (see also Hassabis & Maguire 2007). Access of 
hippocampal representations may also inform the perception of ongoing 
events, as memories are called to mind to update understanding of the 
present based on the past (Chen et al. 2016). 
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As a memory is retrieved, the hippocampus coordinates the 
reinstatement of its features represented in cortical areas (Carr et al. 2011; 
Norman & O’Reilly 2003). Previous experiences are ‘replayed’ through the 
sequential firing of hippocampal cells that represent the trajectory of recent 
experience (Carr et al. 2011). Hippocampal replay is thought to facilitate 
memory consolidation and retrieval, and replay-like activity has been shown to 
support the successful retrieval of event sequences (Thavabalasingam et al. 
2019; Wimmer et al. 2020). As events are retrieved, their specific features are 
reinstated in cortical regions involved in their representation. For instance, 
remembering a scene involves activity in scene-selective regions, 
remembering a face involves activity in face-selective regions, and so on 
(e.g., Polyn et al. 2005). In support, neuroimaging studies have shown 
evidence for the memory-related reactivation of cortical brain patterns 
associated with specific events (e.g., Staresina et al. 2013, Bonnici et al. 
2016, Chen et al. 2017). When recall is extended over time, as in real-world 
instances of remembering, transient reactivation of content-selective areas 
follows along with the contents of dynamic recall (Gilmore et al. 2021). 
Importantly, cortical reactivation has been shown to be mediated by retrieval-
related activity in the hippocampus (Horner et al. 2015; Ritchey et al. 2013; 
Treder et al. 2021), and its relation to the subjective experience of recollection 
depends on the integrity of the hippocampus (Elward et al. 2021). The 
features of memory are reactivated in a cohesive manner, with the 
hippocampus supporting incidental reactivation of non-target associations that 
have been integrated in memory, consistent with a pattern completion account 
(Horner et al. 2015) (Figure 1C). In a recent study, Treder and colleagues 
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investigated the timing of hippocampally-mediated reactivation through 
intracranial EEG, finding that peak hippocampal firing marked the transition 
from cue representation to target reactivation (Treder et al. 2021). 
Interestingly, target reactivation was followed by an increase in activity in 
medial parietal, medial prefrontal, and lateral parietal areas, suggesting the 
engagement of these regions in elaborating on the reactivated contents of 
episodic memory.  
 In sum, the hippocampus acts to bind together distinct features of an 
episodic memory, organizing memories around space and time to produce an 
allocentric ‘cognitive map’-like representation. These bound representations 
provide the necessary support structure for accessing individual memories 
and reconstructing their specific event features — processes that are 
sufficient for successful performance on many laboratory-based memory 
tasks, such as source memory or cued recall. However, when it comes time to 
elaborate on the details of the memory, other cortical areas appear to be 
recruited, including the lateral parietal cortex, suggesting the need for extra-
hippocampal processes to support the sustained subjective experience of 
episodic memory.  
 
Lateral parietal cortex 
With the advent of functional neuroimaging, evidence has rapidly accumulated 
that cortical brain regions beyond the hippocampus might play an important 
role in episodic memory, one such region being the left lateral parietal cortex, 
particularly the area around the left angular gyrus (e.g., Wagner et al. 2005).  
Although lesions in medial parietal regions have been known for many years 
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to cause amnesia (Cavanna & Trimble 2006), there are few reports in the 
neuropsychological literature of memory impairments following lateral parietal 
lesions.  If damage to lateral parietal areas does not result in amnesia, what 
might explain the frequent observations of angular gyrus activity in healthy 
volunteers during performance of episodic memory tasks?  A number of 
theoretical accounts have been proposed (Shimamura 2011; Wagner et al. 
2005), but recent evidence suggests that left angular gyrus, as part of the 
posterior medial brain network, might be particularly important for the 
subjective experience of remembering. 
 First, it is important to confirm that the absence of reports of amnesia in 
the parietal lobe neuropsychological case literature is not simply because 
memory was never properly tested in such patients, and that damage to this 
region might cause memory impairment that was previously overlooked.  A 
number of studies have found that patients with parietal lobe lesions exhibit 
intact recognition memory, source memory, and associative memory (Berryhill 
et al. 2009; Davidson et al. 2008; Simons et al. 2010; Ciaramelli et al. 2017), 
and can answer questions accurately about autobiographical events they 
experienced in the past (Berryhill et al. 2007; Davidson et al. 2008).  Many of 
these findings have been replicated in brain stimulation studies involving 
healthy volunteers that have aimed selectively to disrupt left angular gyrus 
responses (Bonnici et al. 2018; Thakral et al. 2017b; Yazar et al. 2014). It 
seems clear that reduced angular gyrus function does not result in amnesia; 





Subjective measures, such as confidence and vividness 
One way to characterize the memory tasks that appear not to be sensitive to 
angular gyrus dysfunction is that they typically involve the provision of a 
specific retrieval cue and can often be accomplished by activating and 
bringing to awareness a relatively small subset of event features. The retrieval 
cue might be a target stimulus that was studied previously or a specific 
question relating to a past episode, and needs only to activate sufficient 
features to permit a relatively simple response decision to be made, such as 
that the target stimulus is “old” rather than “new”, or that the actor we saw in a 
Shakespeare play last summer was named Jill.  In such tasks, retrieval 
success, which depends on a number of factors operating at encoding and 
retrieval, can be measured objectively by reference to the stimuli that were 
actually studied or to an independent account of the past experience, and can 
in many cases be accompanied by little reconstructed conscious awareness 
of the event as a whole.  
 Although many laboratory memory experiments involve objective tasks 
like recognition or source memory that appear not to require intact angular 
gyrus function, other memory tasks go beyond a simple mapping between cue 
and stored features to involve the construction of a more detailed, 
multifaceted representation that brings to conscious awareness a subjective 
experience of remembering a past event as it unfolded (what Tulving, 1983, 
called “autonoetic awareness”).  Such tasks might require an individual to 
reflect on the content of a memory to decide whether a stimulus is 
“remembered” along with associated contextual details, or merely “known” to 
have been previously encountered.  Tasks might require the rememberer to 
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evaluate the qualitative characteristics of a memory in order to judge its 
richness, vividness, or one’s confidence in its accuracy.  Alternatively, they 
might involve combining distinct forms of information, such as multiple 
sensory modalities or different spatio-temporal frameworks, into a complex 
feature network that characterizes an autobiographical experience and 
enables the individual to “relive” the event as it originally unfolded and to 
recount it to others. 
 Whereas medial temporal lobe function underpins both objective and 
subjective memory, much recent evidence suggests that subjective memory 
tasks depend additionally on the function of left angular gyrus and 
surrounding posterior medial brain areas.  Neuropsychological and 
neurostimulation studies focused on dysfunction in this region have observed 
accurate performance on recognition or source memory tasks but reduced 
confidence (Ciaramelli et al. 2017; Simons et al. 2010; Yazar et al. 2014) 
(Figure 2A) and fewer “remember” responses on remember/know tasks 
(Davidson et al. 2008).  Such reductions appear specific to recollection, with 
confidence in recognition memory and other cognitive abilities unaffected, 
arguing against a general metacognitive account. Functional imaging 
experiments involving healthy volunteers have found activity in left angular 
gyrus, or the more medial precuneus, to be sensitive to qualitative 
characteristics of retrieved memories, such as their rated vividness or 
confidence (Kuhl & Chun 2014; Richter et al. 2016; Tibon et al. 2019), and to 
be greater when recollection is indexed by “remember” rather than source 
memory responses (Frithsen & Miller 2014; Yu et al. 2012).  Patients with 
parietal damage, whose autobiographical memory is intact when cued by 
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specific questions about events (Berryhill et al. 2007), exhibit impairment 
when asked to freely recall the events (Berryhill et al. 2007; Davidson et al. 
2008), a result replicated in brain stimulation studies that disrupt angular 
gyrus function in healthy volunteers (Bonnici et al. 2018; Thakral et al. 2017b). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Multisensory integration of distributed mnemonic features  
If angular gyrus contributes to memory by combining distinct forms of 
retrieved information to construct the kind of complex, multifaceted 
representation that enables the subjective conscious experience of reliving a 
past event, the region should be sensitive to tasks that require integrating 
disparate event features, such as multimodal sensory-perceptual details 
(Shimamura 2011).  Anatomically, angular gyrus is an ideal candidate to 
integrate mnemonic information relating to multiple sensory modalities, as a 
connective hub that links distributed sensory association cortices with frontal 
and medial temporal regions (Seghier 2013).  Consistent with this proposal, 
Bonnici et al. (2016) observed neuroimaging evidence of greater left angular 
gyrus activity during retrieval of integrated multimodal memories compared 
with memories that were of only a single modality (Figure 2B).  The authors 
found that a pattern classifier was able to decode individual multimodal but 
not unimodal memories from activity patterns in angular gyrus and, notably, 
that classifier accuracy tracked the subjective vividness with which 
participants rated their memories.  In other words, a distinctive multimodal 
memory representation in left angular gyrus (as measured by the pattern 
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classifier) was subjectively experienced by participants as a vivid recollection 
(Bonnici et al. 2016; see also, Kuhl & Chun 2014).  Supporting the hypothesis 
that angular gyrus is necessary for multimodal integration of sensory event 
features, the ability of participants to retrieve information from multiple 
modalities, but not from single modalities, was significantly reduced following 
brain stimulation targeting angular gyrus compared to stimulation of a control 
region (Yazar et al. 2017). 
 A sensitivity to multimodal information is also apparent in angular gyrus 
during performance of semantic memory tasks (Humphreys et al. 2021).  In 
the semantic retrieval literature, angular gyrus has been proposed as a 
convergence zone between sensory association cortices, based on its activity 
across a range of modality-specific associations (Binder et al. 2009).  During 
episodic retrieval, angular gyrus exhibits greater activity for multimodal than 
unimodal memories, whereas during semantic retrieval, statistically equivalent 
levels of activity are observed for multimodal and unimodal information 
(Bonnici et al. 2016).  This apparent distinction may be attributable to 
differences in the nature of episodic and semantic memories, with retrieval of 
unimodal semantic memories likely to involve activation spreading throughout 
conceptual knowledge networks to associated multimodal details (Patterson 
et al. 2007), reducing differences between unimodal and multimodal 
conditions.  Further research is necessary to understand the extent to which 
multimodal angular gyrus activity variations reflect a single underlying function 
that might be modulated differentially during episodic and semantic 
processing (Humphreys et al. 2021).  In any event, the link between angular 
gyrus pattern classification accuracy and the vividness of participants’ 
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recollections (Bonnici et al. 2016; Kuhl & Chun 2014) indicates that, in the 
case of episodic memory at least, angular gyrus plays a key role in the 
subjective experiencing of our memories as rich, multisensory events 
(Ciaramelli et al. 2017; Tibon et al. 2019). 
 
Objective measures of memory precision 
A challenge with seeking to understand the subjective experience of 
remembering is that, as with the study of consciousness more generally, 
much of the evidence comes from self-report measures in which participants 
are asked to introspect on the nature of their own conscious experience.  
Individuals might be asked to rate their memories for vividness or confidence.  
They might be asked to judge whether their memories meet criteria to be 
classified as “remembered” rather than “known”.  They might be asked to 
freely recall a previous experience, using their own judgment as to which 
details to include or leave out.  As noted in the Methodologies section above, 
such self-report measures can provide valuable insights into the 
phenomenology of subjective experience, but they are vulnerable to 
numerous cognitive biases and demand characteristics.  As a result of these 
issues, it can be difficult to establish the extent to which reported qualities of 
the subjective experience of remembering map onto objective characteristics 
of the memory content on which they are based. 
 To overcome these limitations, recent research has investigated the 
utility of tasks that go beyond traditional binary measures of objective 
recollection to involve continuous episodic retrieval measures that can track 
the precision with which memories are recalled.  Such measures can reveal 
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on a continuous scale the extent to which memories range from high-fidelity, 
precise reconstructions of previous experiences to less accurate, lower-
resolution representations (Brady et al. 2013; Harlow & Yonelinas 2016).  
Evidence suggests that variation in memory precision may be underpinned by 
at least partly distinct cognitive and brain mechanisms from those responsible 
for the binary success vs. failure of memory retrieval (Cooper & Ritchey 2019; 
Richter et al. 2016).  For example, retrieval success and precision can be 
differentially affected by experimental manipulations (Sutterer & Awh 2016), 
developmental conditions (Cooper et al. 2017), and age-related cognitive 
decline (Korkki et al. 2020).  Neuroimaging and neurostimulation evidence 
suggests that different regions of the posterior-medial memory network may 
contribute to the precision with which memories are retrieved (Cooper & 
Ritchey 2019; Montchal et al. 2019; Richter et al. 2016).  For example, some 
studies have observed activity in the hippocampus or surrounding medial 
temporal lobe structures to be sensitive to precision (e.g., Montchal et al. 
2019), but Richter et al. (2016) found that the success and precision of 
episodic retrieval could be dissociated neurally when compared directly in the 
same statistical model, with retrieval success associated with activity in the 
hippocampus whereas retrieval precision scaled with activity in left angular 
gyrus (Figure 2C) (see also, Cooper et al. 2017).   
These findings are consistent with the idea that functional interactions 
between the hippocampus and cortical regions such as the angular gyrus are 
important for reconstructing precise, detailed memory representations 
(Ritchey & Cooper 2020).  It may be that the hippocampus initiates memory 
retrieval in response to a retrieval cue, providing a threshold signal denoting 
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whether the cue succeeds or fails to elicit recollection (Yonelinas 2002).  This 
threshold signal can be sufficient for performing many lab-based memory 
tasks that are based on binary responses, but for tasks that require more 
qualitative judgments about the detail of a previous experience, 
hippocampally-mediated reinstatement of the memory in cortical regions such 
as angular gyrus may be necessary for generating a precise representation of 
the integrated episodic content (Richter et al. 2016). 
 
Egocentric spatial frameworks and importance for first-person perspective 
As outlined in the Introduction, another element that is so crucial to the 
subjective experience we have when remembering an event is the first-person 
perspective from which the reconstructed event typically unfolds in front of us.  
Evidence suggests that parietal lobe regions may be particularly important for 
imbuing our memories with this characteristic quality.  Studies of spatial 
navigation have found parietal cortex to support egocentric spatial cognitive 
functions, in contrast to the allocentric “cognitive map” spatial processes that 
are associated with the hippocampus (Ciaramelli et al. 2010; Weniger et al. 
2009; Zaehle et al. 2007).  For example, patients with parietal lobe lesions 
exhibit deficits on egocentric tests of spatial cognition such as landmark 
sequencing and route navigation, but are unimpaired on allocentric spatial 
tasks that involve imagining a map of landmark locations (Ciaramelli et al. 
2010; Weniger et al. 2009).  In contrast, patients with hippocampal lesions 
have been found to be impaired on tasks assessing allocentric but not 
egocentric spatial memory (Holdstock et al. 2000; Rosenbaum et al. 2000).  
Consistent with the idea that parietal lobe dysfunction may lead to impairment 
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in egocentric aspects of memory, Berryhill et al. (2010) observed that when 
patients with parietal lesions recalled past autobiographical events, they were 
less likely to represent themselves in the scenes that they created, and 
reported fewer details about their thinking, their emotional states and their 
own actions during their narratives.  Similar findings have been reported in 
healthy volunteers following inhibitory brain stimulation targeting left angular 
gyrus, which led to a reduced tendency for participants to report subjectively 
experiencing autobiographical episodes from an egocentric, first-person 
perspective (Bonnici et al. 2018). 
Neuroimaging evidence links egocentric spatial processing with medial 
parietal regions such as the precuneus (Hebscher et al. 2018; St. Jacques et 
al. 2017).  For example, when healthy volunteers undertook the landmark 
sequencing and route navigation spatial cognition tasks mentioned above, 
significant activity was observed in left medial parietal regions around the 
precuneus (Rosenbaum et al. 2004).  Wolbers et al. (2008) observed 
activation in the precuneus when participants performed a task in a virtual 
environment that involved keeping track of the positions of surrounding 
objects relative to their own bodies.  Similarly, when participants were asked 
to make spatial judgments with respect to themselves or without any self-
referential framing, egocentric spatial coding engaged the precuneus whereas 
allocentric coding was associated with hippocampal activity (Zaehle et al. 
2007) (Figure 2D).  The precuneus may thus be important for episodic 
memory by providing an egocentric spatial framework that can be utilized by 
angular gyrus in constructing its integrated episodic representation.  
Anatomical connectivity between the precuneus and angular gyrus, via the 
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occipito-frontal fascicle, has been identified by diffusion-tensor based 
segmentation and tractography studies (Seghier 2013).  In this way, angular 
gyrus interactions with surrounding structures might support the integration of 
multimodal memory features within an egocentric framework into the kind of 
first-person perspective representation that enables the subjective re-
experiencing of past events. 
 
Anterior prefrontal cortex 
If many of the everyday demands we make of our memory system can be 
accomplished without requiring the embellished level of awareness that 
accompanies the subjective experience of remembering, an important 
question is what adaptive value is gained by constructing the kind of 
integrated egocentric representation that angular gyrus appears to provide.  
One possibility proposed by Tulving (1983) is that subjective experience (what 
he called “autonoetic awareness”) affords the adaptive benefit of being able to 
reflect on the content of our memories, and to make judgments about the 
things we remember, such as distinguishing events that actually occurred 
from those we might have imagined. This ability enables us to weigh more 
highly real versus imagined events when changing our behavior on the basis 
of our previous experiences. 
 
Subjective experience as a basis for reality monitoring 
Such mnemonic evaluation and judgment abilities are considered to require 
the recruitment of cognitive control processes that are supported by regions of 
prefrontal cortex.  Several memory-related functional distinctions have been 
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identified within prefrontal cortex, including between ventrolateral, 
dorsolateral, and anterior prefrontal cortex.  Roles have been ascribed for the 
ventrolateral region in the specification of retrieval cues and the maintenance 
of recovered information.  For example, Dobbins et al. (2002) identified a 
region of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex that was active during both semantic 
processing and source recollection tasks, but not during item recognition, 
interpreting its likely function in recollection as reflecting the controlled 
semantic analysis necessary for the specification of effective retrieval cues.  
This region was differentiated from a more posterior region of ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex, which showed significant activity across semantic 
processing, source recollection, and item recognition tasks, consistent with 
previous suggestions of a role in lexical/phonological maintenance in working 
memory (Poldrack et al. 1999). The post-retrieval stage of monitoring and 
evaluating recovered information has been linked with dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex.  For example, Henson et al. (2000) operationalized monitoring by 
contrasting situations in which participants expressed low confidence in their 
memory with situations in which they were highly confident, observing 
activation in right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  Similar results implicating 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex were also found when the higher monitoring 
demands of a source recollection task were contrasted with item recognition, 
considered to rely more on judgments of familiarity (Rugg et al. 1999).  The 
role played by anterior prefrontal cortex has been more difficult to characterize 
but, consistent with the involvement of nearby regions in self-referential 
processing (e.g., D’Argembeau et al. 2007), considerable evidence now 
points to a key contribution to ‘reality monitoring’, the particular kind of post-
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retrieval evaluation that provides the ability to distinguish self-generated from 
externally-derived information, which helps us make judgments about whether 
our memories are real (Johnson et al. 1993; Simons et al. 2017).   
 According to the Source Monitoring Framework, such judgments about 
the reality of retrieved experiences are typically based on consideration of 
their features in the light of characteristics that tend to be associated with 
different kinds of events (Johnson et al. 1993).  A memory that is full of vivid 
visual details is likely to be real, one that is primarily auditory in nature might 
reflect an event we were told about by someone else, whereas one mainly 
comprising traces of self-generated thoughts may well have been imagined.  
Numerous experiments have explored the brain regions that are sensitive to 
manipulations of internally- and externally-generated memory features 
(Simons et al. 2017).  For example, participants might be asked to remember 
whether familiar word pairs were previously presented in full (e.g., ‘Romeo 
and Juliet’) or whether the second word had to be imagined (e.g., ‘Romeo and 
?’).  Such judgments between real and imagined information are consistently 
associated with activity in medial aspects of anterior prefrontal cortex 
(Kensinger & Schacter 2006; Simons et al. 2006).  Similarly, medial anterior 
prefrontal activity is observed when memory judgments require distinguishing 
the self-generated thoughts elicited by tasks previously undertaken compared 
with perceptual features such as the location, size, or time in which stimuli 
were presented (Dobbins & Wagner 2005; Gilbert et al. 2010; Simons et al. 
2005).  Furthermore, medial anterior responses are sensitive to judgments of 
whether tasks were previously undertaken by oneself or another agent 
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Reality monitoring variability in the general population 
Examining the behavioral data from studies of reality monitoring in healthy 
volunteers, it is clear that there is a great deal of variability in performance, 
with some people able to distinguish self-generated and externally-derived 
information relatively successfully and others performing much more poorly 
(Buda et al. 2011).  Evidence indicates that these individual differences in the 
general population may have a specific brain structural basis in the medial 
anterior prefrontal cortex, the region identified as functionally involved in the 
neuroimaging data considered above.  There are a number of structural 
landmarks in the brain that emerge relatively late in development and, due to 
a combination of genetic and environmental influences, exhibit considerable 
individual variability in the general population (Van Essen 1997).  One such 
structural variation in the medial prefrontal cortex is the paracingulate sulcus 
which, as a tertiary sulcus, is one of the last sulci to develop in utero, varying 
considerably in size between individuals (Paus et al. 1996) (Figure 3B).  
Healthy adults whose structural brain scans indicate absence of the 
paracingulate sulcus in both hemispheres exhibit significantly reduced reality 
monitoring performance compared with people who have a prominent 
paracingulate sulcus on at least one side of the brain (Buda et al. 2011) 
(Figure 3C).  Reduced sulcal folding may reflect weakened intra- and inter-
regional connectivity (Van Essen 1997). This suggests that individual 
differences in reality monitoring ability may be attributable to variations in 
36 
 
functional brain network connectivity between the medial prefrontal cortex and 
posterior cortical regions (such as angular gyrus) which are involved in 
processing the multisensory feature representations that enable the subjective 
experience of remembering (Fornito et al. 2012). 
 
Hallucinations and schizophrenia 
Disturbed awareness of what is real may also underlie some of the symptoms 
of psychiatric conditions such as schizophrenia, in which a person’s relation to 
reality can be altered in ways that disrupt their everyday functioning.  Between 
60% and 80% of patients with schizophrenia experience frequent 
hallucinations (Slade & Bentall 1988), for example hearing a person speaking 
when there is nobody there.  Activity associated with hallucinations is often 
observed in auditory and visual sensory processing areas (Zmigrod et al. 
2016), suggesting that part of the explanation for hallucinations may be self-
generated sensory experiences that are unusually vivid, such that they 
resemble the features typical of real events.  However, differences are also 
found in medial anterior prefrontal areas around the paracingulate sulcus in 
schizophrenia, consistent with an additional difficulty with discriminating self-
generated and externally derived information (Frith & Done 1989).  People 
with schizophrenia are often impaired on reality monitoring tasks (Bentall et al. 
1991; Brébion et al. 2000), tending to misattribute imagined stimuli as real 
(Stephane et al. 2010; Vinogradov et al. 1997), an effect that is associated 
with reduced activity in anterior prefrontal cortex (Garrison et al. 2017; 
Vinogradov et al. 2008).  Moreover, the occurrence of hallucinations in people 
with schizophrenia can be predicted on the basis of paracingulate sulcus 
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length, with sulcal reductions in individuals with a history of hallucinations 
compared with those who received their diagnosis based on other symptoms 
(Garrison et al. 2015; Rollins et al. 2020) (Figure 3D). 
 
Conclusions and future directions  
We began by itemizing five aspects of the subjective experience of 
remembering that a scientific account must endeavor to explain: its 
reconstructive nature, its multisensory qualities, its relation to the self, its 
capacity to adopt both first-person and third-person perspectives, and its 
sensitivity to social and cultural influences. We conclude by considering how 
well current cognitive neuroscientific models can account for these features, 
and how existing gaps in scientific understanding might direct future research.   
First, with regard to the reconstructive nature of memory, we have 
reviewed findings implicating a posterior medial subsystem of the default 
network in processes generating vivid, cohesive memory reconstructions. The 
research reviewed supports the idea of the hippocampus as providing the 
informational foundation for the subjective experience of remembering, with 
particular roles in binding of contextual details and accessing and reactivating 
event features in a cohesive way. These functions may be contrasted with the 
role of the left lateral parietal cortex in guiding the specificity of feature 
reconstruction. These processes are further supported by distinct prefrontal 
cortical areas, such as areas of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (with roles in 
the specification of retrieval cues and the maintenance of recovered 
information), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (implicated in the post-retrieval 
stage of monitoring and evaluating recovered information).  
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Secondly, the multisensory qualities of a subjectively experienced 
episodic memory appear to result from the integration of information from 
sensory representational areas with other event features. A specific region of 
left lateral parietal cortex, the area around the angular gyrus, is anatomically 
well placed to receive information from sensory areas, and has been strongly 
implicated in the integration, in functional interaction with the hippocampus, of 
disparate forms of mnemonic information in creating the complex, 
multifaceted representations that enable the subjective experience of reliving 
a past event.  
With regard to the self-related quality of episodic memories, a key 
process is the distinction between internally- and externally-generated 
sources of information, in which medial areas of anterior prefrontal cortex 
have been strongly implicated. These neural substrates appear significant for 
recognizing that a memory representation happened to one’s own self, as 
opposed to being an imagined event or an experience that happened to 
another person.  
Our fourth aspect of subjective experience, the perspectival feature of 
an autobiographical memory, likely depends on egocentric spatial frameworks 
associated with medial parietal regions such as the precuneus, contrasting 
against the allocentric cognitive map-like representations afforded by the 
hippocampus. These frameworks underlie the first- or third-person 
perspectives adopted in an episode of remembering, and likely constitute one 
of the sources of information utilized by the angular gyrus in constructing 
integrated, multimodal representations of past events.  
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Evidence relating to the fifth aspect, sensitivity to social and cultural 
influences, is currently in shorter supply. We have proposed that further 
advances in understanding the subjective experience of remembering will 
benefit from an interdisciplinary approach capable of incorporating findings 
from seven distinct levels of analysis: the molecular, cellular, neural, cognitive, 
personal, social and cultural (Simons et al. 2020). Although progress has 
been made in understanding cognitive mechanisms in social memory 
processes such as collaborative remembering (Rajaram 2011), social 
contagion (Harris et al. 2017) and memory conformity (Maswood et al. 2019), 
there is currently only limited evidence on neural mechanisms specific to 
social processes in memory. Edelson et al. (2011) reported a distinct brain 
signature of enhanced amygdala activity and enhanced amygdala-
hippocampus connectivity predicting long-lasting but not temporary memory 
alterations following exposure to the erroneous recollections of a social group. 
Even in the absence of overt social influences, individuals tend to exhibit 
largely similar patterns of brain activity during recall of a narrative event (Chen 
et al. 2017), leaving open the question of what neural processes support the 
idiosyncratic (versus shared) experience of memory. One’s cultural 
background may additionally influence the way that memories are 
reconstructed: for instance, individuals from East Asian and Western cultures 
differ in the way that they incorporate contextual and self-relevant details in 
memory (reviewed by Gutchess & Huff 2016), suggesting a basis for cultural 
differences in the subjective experience of memory. Conversely, the link 
discussed above between paracingulate sulcus reductions and hallucinations 
in schizophrenia has been found to generalize across patients from Australia, 
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the United Kingdom, and China (Garrison et al. 2015; Rollins et al. 2020). 
With a view to future research in this area, issues such as the phenomenology 
of collective remembering and cultural influences on remembering will likely 
require further integration with findings and theoretical concepts at the social 
and cultural levels of explanation.  
Such investigations are likely to require further interdisciplinary 
methodological advances which may in turn have implications for general 
endeavors to advance the study of subjective experience. Perspectives from 
the arts and humanities will likely highlight aspects of the subjective 
experience of remembering that have so far been invisible to scientific inquiry, 
such as nuances in the vividness of remembered experience, the framing and 
reframing of memories in narratives as they unfold over time, and the 
phenomenology of collective remembering. Sources of evidence such as 
social history, oral testimony and literary texts can, when incorporated into 
scientific study design, expand the range of questions that scientists can ask 
about memory (Simons et al. 2020), while further advances in techniques 
such as experience sampling promise to enrich the qualitative and 
quantitative data with which scientists can work, such as describing multiple, 
parallel streams of experience containing both internal and external foci of 
attention (Fernyhough et al. 2018).  
While beyond the scope of this article, it is also important to consider 
the developmental implications of what has been learned and what remains to 
be discovered about the neural underpinnings of the subjective experience of 
remembering. Assessing the subjective experience of remembering in 
childhood is fraught with difficulties, including infantile amnesia and 
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methodological issues such as language and task demands. Research has 
shown that young children can report vivid autobiographical memories with all 
of the subjective aspects considered here (Bauer 2006), although the 
integration of processes necessary for vivid, multisensory remembering is 
rate-limited by a variety of developmental factors. Childhood memory 
narratives are also powerfully shaped by sociocultural influences including 
parental conversational style (Reese et al. 1993) and cultural differences 
(Wang 2006). Developing source-monitoring capacities (Lindsay et al. 1991) 
and cortical maturation (Bauer 2006) are likely to shape children’s subjective 
experience of remembering in a dynamic, developmental way, appropriate for 
a functional systems approach (see below) in which different neural systems 
interact with each other in flexible ways across development.  
 Our discussion has emphasized how brain mechanisms of 
remembering can be understood at the network in addition to the region level 
of analysis. At the network level, the hippocampus, left lateral parietal cortex, 
and medial portions of the anterior prefrontal cortex interact strongly as part of 
the posterior medial subsystem of the default network that is especially 
involved in tasks involving episodic construction (Ritchey & Cooper 2020; 
Rugg & Vilberg 2013; Schacter & Addis 2007). Yet compelling evidence for 
region-specific dissociations (such as between hippocampus and posterior 
medial cortical regions in recollection), as well as interactions with areas 
outside of this system (such as the lateral prefrontal cortex), point to the need 
for a framework for understanding region and network contributions that is 
sufficiently dynamic and flexible to allow for process-specific alliances 
(Cabeza et al. 2018) that explain variability in the subjective experience of 
42 
 
remembering. One such framework is provided by A. R. Luria’s (1965) 
conception of functional systems, defined as systems of hierarchically 
organized processes which interact in dynamically changing constellations of 
elements, such that a specific task can be achieved from moment to moment 
by differing profiles of interacting subsystems (Fernyhough 2010). This 
approach stemmed from Luria’s dissatisfaction with the ‘narrow 
localizationism’ that distinguished early work in neurology, along with the need 
to integrate neural and cognitive levels of explanation (Fernyhough 2010; 
Luria 1980).  
Functional systems have been proposed as a way of characterizing the 
‘networks of networks’ that underpin functionally complex experiences such 
as verbally mediated mind-wandering and inner speech (Alderson-Day & 
Fernyhough 2015). They are distinct from other approaches to understanding 
brain-wide collaborations among neural systems, such as large-scale brain 
networks (Bressler & Menon 2010), which are conceptualized in a bottom-up 
way through data-driven network analysis of activity in brain nodes and hubs. 
In contrast, the functional systems framework proposes a more top-down 
approach to postulating interactions among cognitive and neural systems 
based on theoretical insights as well as cognitive and neural data. Crucially, it 
also emphasizes how these dynamic interactions among brain systems are 
shaped by developmental, social and cultural factors (Luria 1965). In 
understanding how memory operates at the levels of brain regions, networks, 
and networks of networks, a functional systems approach may prove 
particularly valuable in understanding developmental change in the subjective 
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experience of remembering, as well as the reorganization of the memory 
system that can follow brain damage.  
In taking such an approach, we can begin to explain the subjective 
experience of remembering as arising from dynamic interactions between the 
functional brain networks that are responsible for different components of 
episodic cognition, which can be recruited when required to meet the 
demands of the retrieval situation faced (Figure 4).  According to this view, the 
hippocampus and surrounding medial temporal lobe system reactivate and 
bind elements of an episodic memory, including its sensory-perceptual 
features, within an allocentric spatiotemporal context to produce a rapid and 
relatively sparse representation that is sufficient for many of the everyday 
demands we make of our memory and, indeed, many lab-based memory 
tasks.  When task instructions or internal goals require us to go further, and to 
reflect consciously on the content of our memory in order to make judgments 
about it or to construct a narrative reminiscence about the original event, 
lateral parietal (especially left angular gyrus) and medial parietal brain areas 
are recruited to produce a more detailed, multifaceted representation that 
brings to conscious awareness an egocentric, multimodal subjective 
experience of remembering the event as it unfolded.  Interactions with frontal 
networks including anterior prefrontal cortex enable the cognitive control 
processes necessary to evaluate and make decisions about our memory, 
helping us to keep track of our thoughts, feelings and reflections, and 
distinguish them from events we may have experienced or been told about by 
someone else.  This valuable ability allows us to understand and learn from 
44 
 
our experiences, and to use them to make sense of the world and guide 
subsequent behavior.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Remembering has a subjective quality that must figure in scientific accounts 
of its functioning. This challenge has begun to be met by new methodologies 
for gathering data on these phenomenological properties, more nuanced 
design of experimental paradigms allowing separate aspects of the subjective 
experience of remembering to be teased apart in the laboratory, and a 
growing understanding of the neural regions, networks, and functional 
systems that underpin these psychological processes. By considering 
memory in its deep experiential richness, scientists can hope to make further 
progress in future years towards an explanation of human beings’ capacity to 
relive, in varying shades of phenomenological color, the most trivial and the 
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Figure 1. Hippocampus 
A. At the time of retrieval, hippocampal representations are organized 
according to the spatial similarity (top) and temporal similarity (bottom) of 
real-world events. From Nielson et al. 2015. 
B. Hippocampal activity peaks during early phases of autobiographical 
memory retrieval (top), in contrast to activity in visual cortex, which peaks 
later as memories are elaborated (bottom). Adapted from Daselaar et al. 
2008. 
C. Hippocampal activity is correlated with reactivation of non-target 
associations during retrieval of an integrated (“closed-loop”) episodic 
memory. From Horner et al. 2015. 
 
Figure 2. Left Lateral Parietal Cortex 
A. The objectively accurate recollections of patients with lateral parietal 
lesions are associated with reduced subjective confidence compared with 
matched control participants. Adapted from Simons et al. (2010). 
B. In left angular gyrus (shown in yellow), greater activity is observed during 
retrieval of integrated audio-visual memories compared with memories of 
only a single modality. From Bonnici et al. (2016). 
C. Retrieval success is associated with activity in the hippocampus whereas 
retrieval precision scales with activity in left angular gyrus. Adapted from 
Richter et al. (2016). 
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D. Allocentric spatial coding activates the hippocampus (shown in red) 
whereas egocentric spatial coding activates precuneus (shown in blue). 
From Zaehle et al. (2007). 
 
Figure 3. Anterior Prefrontal Cortex 
A. Locations of medial anterior prefrontal cortex activity reported by 12 fMRI 
studies of reality monitoring in healthy volunteers. 
B. Examples of long (left panel) and short (right panel) paracingulate sulci 
(marked in red). Adapted from Garrison et al. (2015). 
C. Healthy volunteers in whom the paracingulate sulcus is absent in both 
hemispheres exhibit reduced reality monitoring performance. Adapted 
from Buda et al. (2011). 
D. Paracingulate sulcus length predicts occurrence of hallucinations in 
schizophrenia, being reduced in patients who hallucinate whereas there is 
no difference between those who do not hallucinate and control 
participants. From Garrison et al. (2015). 
 
Figure 4. Brain Mechanisms of Subjective Remembering 
Key regions of interest are shown in bolded font, with important auxiliary 
regions (medial parietal cortex, which includes precuneus, and sensory 
regions, processing different modalities of information) also shown. Arrows 
reflect network interactions supporting communication among these regions. 
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